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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to do a general survey 
on the existing communication modes inside a smart grid, the 
existing security loopholes and their countermeasures. Then 
we suggest a detailed countermeasure, building upon the 
Jigsaw based secure data transfer [8] for enhanced security of 
the data flow inside the communication system of a smart 
grid. The paper has been written without the consideration of 
any factor of inoperability between the various security 
techniques inside a smart grid 
Keywords: Smart Grid, Multi-path routing, Data Transfer 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific advances in the field of power generation 
and distribution has led to the development of the smart grid 
(SG). A typical smart grid facilitates the efficient distribution 
and automated metering of electricity amongst the end users. 
An SG employs a two way system of exchange of electricity 
and information for sustaining the whole power grid with 
minimal human interaction. This two way system can briefly 
be summarized as follows.    
 Two way flow of electricity: It refers to 
bidirectional flow of electricity between the smart grid and the 
users, the latter contributing by means of supplying electricity 
generated through commercial solar panels back into the grid 
[1].     
 Two way flow of information: A high performance 
communication network is necessary for automation and flow 
of information in an effective manner. The communication 
architecture consists of Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN), 
Building Area Network (BAN) and Home Area Network 
(HAN). NAN contains a number of BANs and each BAN is 
composed of a number of HANs. In HAN, the house hold 
appliances are connected to smart meters through wireless 
network like Zigbee, WiFi, Power line based communication. 
BAN collects information from HAN and delivers it to NAN. 
NAN gathers information from various units of BAN and 
sends it to the control centre.  Smart meters are finally 
connected to a metering gateway. Smart meter is a device 
which delegates two way communications between the 
various communication units.   
 This inherent capability of automated functioning of 
the smart grid is made possible by a constant stream of 
information exchange over the internet (Zigbee, WiMAX, 
3G), wired or wireless Ethernet, Bluetooth, fiber optics etc. 
[13].  But as in a desktop or a mobile computing device 
connected to the internet, the relay of data to and fro between 
the various micro level of the communication architecture of a 
SG (a detailed description of the communication framework 
can be found in [2]) is susceptible to cyber-attacks [26] as 
well as loss of valuable information by both the power station 
and customers [25]. As such the use of intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) and network security takes a paramount 
importance for safe confinement of data in their appropriate 
place in the grid. 
2. OVERVIEW 
In Section 3 and 4, we will analyze the different 
communication methods and the security loopholes in the 
existing smart grid models respectively. In Section 5, a brief 
analysis of the existing network security measures and IDS 
will be covered. In section 6, we will structure the whole 
multi-path routing of fragmented data transfer security 
system. In Section 7, we will conclude our paper with a brief 
description regarding the direction in which further research 
can be followed for improving the existing security and 
privacy status of the smart grid.  
3. COMMUNICATION METHODS OF A 
SMART GRID  
The various modes of communication can be 
categorized on two different basis viz.:   
 On the basis of mobility [1], [24]:   
a. Wireless Technologies:    
 i. Wireless Mesh Network (WMN)   
 ii. Cellular Communication System  
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 iii. Cognitive Radio   
 iv. IEEE 802.15    
 v. Satellite Communications   
 vi. Free Space Optical Communications 
b. Wired Technologies    
 i. Fiber Optic Communication  
 ii. Power Line Communication  
     
 On the basis of communication requirements [3]:    
a. Real Time Operational Communication Requirements   
b. Administrative Operational Communication Requirements  
c. Administrative Communication Requirements      
             
    
Fig 1: Classification of communication modes in a smart 
grid 
4. SECURITY LOOPHOLES IN  
INTELLIGRID 
A.  Malware spreading     
 Smart meters mostly communicate wirelessly. 
Spreading a malware into one of the meters can affect all 
other meters as these meters are organized in a mesh 
connected network. 
B.  Reverse engineering    
  Tampering with the smart meters could possibly let 
the attackers turn someone else’s power on and off or 
manipulate consumer’s power bills and even allow the 
attackers to have easy access into the network to steal 
information and stage attacks on the grid. Attackers can 
tamper with the meters to steal power and can increase 
demand for power and vice-versa and even cause blackout. 
C.  Encryption Key Vulnerability 
Insecure implementation of security protocol having 
cryptographic encryption keys [23] on disk, hard-coded in 
software, or keeping in memory for extended periods of time 
could lead to security breach. 
D.   DoS attack     
  Malicious threats such as Botnet can cause serious 
damage to the smart grid.  A bot is an application that 
performs automated task over the internet. Number of Bots 
together is referred to as Botnet. Bot attacks involve threats 
like Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack that causes excess traffic 
in data transmission between nodes by circulating false 
information into the communication network resulting in 
delay or blockage in legitimate data transmission process. 
E.   Stuxnet    
 Malware like Stuxnet [31] is basically designed to 
attack industrial control system specifically targeting 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic 
devices (IED), supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) which is widely used in industries and uses four 
zero-day flaws to attack machines using Microsoft Windows 
operating system. It is introduced using infected USB drives, 
weak passwords etc. The virus spreads into the network 
scanning for PLCs to inject its rootkit module to overwrite the 
legitimate commands and gain control over the grid system. 
Multiple rootkits are responsible for hiding the malicious 
codes from the operators to prevent detection of the Stuxnet. 
5. EXISTING NETWORK SECURITY 
MEASURES 
1. Security patches [17] mitigate any vulnerabilities 
or bugs in the grid network by updating the control system 
software like SCADA to improve the grid’s performance. 
Security patches thwart malicious threats from exploiting the 
vulnerability in a grid system 
2. Intrusion detection and protection system (IDPS) should be 
improvised 
3. Bots in a network can be detected and removed using 
Standalone algorithm and network algorithm. [11] 
4. Secure communications in cognitive radio [4]. 
5. Defence-in-depth is a network security measure for 
prevention of vulnerabilities into the control system 
(SCADA). It is a multi-layered approach which enables an 
operator to respond against cyber-attacks and consequently 
prevent security breach in the grid. The design is basically a 
series of concentric circles [16]. The first layer consists of 
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firewalls along with demilitarized zone (DMZ) which creates 
a kind of sub network that acts as an additional layer to the 
defence of depth. A legitimate user can have access to 
information but an attacker cannot infiltrate into the SCADA 
system as the attacker would be stopped by the DMZ. The 
second layer consists of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), key 
management, patch management. Key management has great 
importance in information security [15]. Authentication is the 
key to access control and having access to authentic public 
keys leads to authenticity for communication. The third layer 
consists of intrusion detection system (IDS) which monitor’s 
network traffic. Any unusual activity in the network is 
typically informed to the operator. The network level consists 
of incident management [14] which involves in monitoring 
and responding to network intrusion. Defence of depth 
improvises itself by discovering new vulnerabilities.  
6. Multifactor security authentication system [5] during access 
to the operational core of the smart grid for manual 
configuration.  
7. Implementing cryptographic algorithms in conjunction with 
stenographic methods to make the information exchange 
between the various sectors of a smart grid invisible to third 
party unauthorized personnel. This can be facilitated by the 
implementation of data hiding techniques using prime 
numbers [6] and natural numbers [9]. 
 8. Security threats such as malware, data theft can be 
minimized using supply chain cyber security [12] which 
augments the cyber security of the grid network within the 
supply chain. 
9. The data transfer by use of IEEE 802.15 is susceptible to 
disruption in its continuous communication flow due to 
intrusion of malicious nodes in its mobile ad-hoc networks. 
These unwanted nodes can be detected and filtered from the 
required information flow by using promiscuous mode and 
appending NTNH field with RREP packet [7]. 
10. For continuous flow of information in the grid network 
which is the most challenging task in mobile ad-hoc network 
(MANET), ant colony optimization (ACO) [29] can be 
implemented. 
11. For a secure communication over optical fiber, we can 
implement methods described in [10].  
 Moreover, many other network security measures 
like High Assurance Smart Grid [14], anonymizing smart grid 
metering data [27] can be implemented. 
6. MULTI-PATH ROUTING OF 
FRAGMENTED DATA TRANSFER: 
Implementing two computing devices at the sending 
and receiving terminal inside a smart grid, we can secure the 
interexchange of information by the use of an automated 
sliced multi-routing jigsaw based secure data transfer [8] with 
minimal manual interaction. The two computing devices are 
kept in sync using a secure cloud based technology as in [18], 
[19], [20], [21], [22], [28] and [30]. 
In case of the automated sliced multi-routing Jigsaw 
based data transfer the following steps takes place 
sequentially: 
i. A packet of data X is divided into N-parts by the 
sending computing device (A) and each part is assigned a 
sequence number based on its data content (X1, X2,…., XN). 
ii. The sequence numbers (say w1) are synced with 
the receiving computer terminal (B) over the cloud and then 
the N-parts are shuffled. 
iii. Each part of the data packet is then transformed 
to X’ by performing the operation 1Xi1 (XOR) Pi for all “i” 
ranging from 1 to k-1, followed by performing transform (P, 
R) which generates a new random number and this number is 
assigned to R. ([8]). 
iv. Using a unique encryption key, the new random 
numbers are shuffled in a random manner and its decryption 
key (w2) is computed at (A) and then synced to (B).  
v. The shuffled random numbers are then sliced into 
M-equal parts, M being constant the value of which is then 
synced to (B). 
vi. Before slicing of each part of the data packet into 
M equal parts, (A) assigns a sub-sequence number (say w3) to 
each slice of the random numbers which is again synced with 
(B). 
vii. The sliced M parts of the random numbers are 
then sent to (B) through M different routes. In each route only 
one slice of each random number is allowed and based on the 
divisibility of M by the lowest factor (Say M is divisible by 
v), the slices are sent in random bundles of “v” slices together. 
This factor “v” is synced with (B).  In this way, any third 
party interference would only result in obtaining an 
unintelligible sub-part of a part of a single data packet which 
is different from the true form of the data packet. 
viii. Upon reaching (B), the slices unbundle 
themselves independently and the M different slices of each 
random numbers are first matched and formed into N random 
numbers using the synced sub-sequence numbers (w3) of each 
random number. 
ix. After the sub-sequence matching, the random 
numbers are reshuffled to their original positions using the 
previously synced decryption key (w2) and the whole packet 
is obtained albeit in the form of combination of random 
numbers derived through the process in [8]. 
x. The Message Authentication Code (MAC) (for 
full details refer [11]) for each packet of data is calculated and 
then compared to the MAC previously assigned to each 
packet and synced with (B). This is performed as a check for 
any tampering of data to alert the whole system.  
xi. The random numbers are converted back to their 
original form of the part of each data pack (again refer to [8] 
for the details of the conversion process). 
xii. After conversion of the random numbers to their 
original form, they are shuffled back into their original 
position by matching of their sequence numbers (w1) in 
accordance to their position in the data. 
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   Fig 2: Operational flow diagram of Multi-Path Routing of Fragmented Data Transfer 
7. CONCLUSION 
We achieved our objective of this paper by 
centralizing all the various communication modes inside a 
smart grid, analyzed their drawbacks from the perspective of 
security and privacy along with a general survey on the 
existing security measures addressing the various security 
loopholes. Then we proposed a security measure for enhanced 
security by building upon the Jigsaw based secure data 
transfer method. In our proposed method, we have minimized 
the stages of human interaction inside the communication 
system of a smart grid to keep the core communication layout 
inaccessible to third party intruders. As a conclusion to our 
paper, we would acknowledge the fact that a boost in the 
cloud computing encryption techniques and implementation 
of additional encryption and stenographic techniques to the 
bundling of the sliced parts of the data would prove to be 
much fruitful in enhancing the security of the multi-path 
routing of fragmented data transfer to a whole new level 
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